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In  social  choice  problems  where  players  may  strategically  misrepresent  their 
preferences,  we  call  a  profile  of  preferences  self-optimal  if  reporting  them  is  a 
Nash  equilibrium  given  that  they  are  the  true  preferences.  Self-optimality  can  be 
interpreted  as  a  very  weak  honesty  requirement.  We  apply  the  self-optimality 
concept  to  a  utility  distortion  game  in  the  context  of  bargaining  and  obtain  a 
characterization  of  efficient  Nash  equilibria.  Journ~ll  of Economic  Literotrtre  Clas- 
sification  Numbers:  020,210,610.  o  19% Academic  PESS. IK. 
1.  INTRODUCTION  ANDGENERAL  FORMULATION 
We  consider  the  following  n-person  social  choice  problem.  N  =  (1,  2, 
.  .  .,  n} denotes  the  set of  individuals,  A is a nonempty  set of  alternatives, 
and,  for  each  individual  i,  Q”’ denotes  a  nonempty  collection  of  utility 
functions  ui:  A -+  R! representing  the  possible  preferences  of  i over  A.  A 
solution  is a function  cp: % +  2A, where  %  :=  QL’ x  .  .  .  x  %“,  such  that 
u’(a)  =  u’(b) for  all i E N,  u = (u’,  .  .  . , d,  .  , . , u”)  E Q,  a, b E (p(u).  Note 
that  a solution  is a social  choice  correspondence;  the  converse,  however, 
does  not  necessarily  hold  in  view  of  the  utility-equivalence  constraint 
implicit  in  the  definition  of  a  solution. 
Suppose  a solution  cp were  single-valued,  Ic&u)J =  I  for  every  14  E  Q.. 
Then  cp  would  be  a game  form,  and,  for  each  fi E Q,  would  give  rise  to  a 
noncooperative  game  with  N  as the  set of  players,  Q”’  as the  strategy  set of 
player  i,  and  a(~&))  E [w” as the  payoff  vector  resulting  from  a strategy  n- 
tuple  u E (IL. Since,  in general,  we  consider  solutions  cp  that  are  not  single- 
valued,  we  give  the  following  definition  of  a Nash  equilibrium. 
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DEFINITION.  We  call  an  (n  +  I)-tuple  (u,  a)  E %  x  A a N&r  equilih- 
riumfor  (o und  u E %  if  the  following  two  conditions  are  satisfied: 
a  E (p(u)  (1) 
v  i E  N  v  6’ E 9Lu’  v  ii E  p(u-‘,  a’)  [u’(u)  2  u’(a)].  (2) 
Here,  we  use  the  notation  (u-‘,  2)  for  the  vector  obtained  from  II  by 
replacing  ~2  by  2.  In  a Nash  equilibrium,  no  player  can  possibly  gain  from 
unilaterally  reporting  a  different  utility  function.  This  Nash  equilibrium 
concept  is equivalent  to  the  equilibrium  notion  introduced  by  Thomson 
(1984,  p.  451). 
An  appropriate  context  for  this  model  is the  following  setting.  There  is a 
central  planner  who  is going  to  use some  solution  cp  to  determine  a final  set 
of  outcomes.  However,  he does  not  know  the  true  utility  functions  of  the 
individuals  or  players,  and  can  only  rely  on  the  information  given  to  him 
by  these  players.  The  players  report  (not  necessarily  true)  utility  func- 
tions  to  the  central  planner.  We  assume  that  the  players  report  an tz-tuple 
of  utility  functions  leading  to  a  Nash  equilibrium  for  the  given  solution 
and  the  true  utility  functions.  For  this  assumption  to  be  reasonable,  one 
might  assume  that  the  players  known  not  only  their  own  but  also  the  other 
players’  utility  functions,  and-especially  in  the  case  of  multiple  Nash 
equilibria-that  there  is some  preplay  communication  between  the  play- 
ers.  Further  the  players  might  suggest  an  equilibrium  selection  N from 
q(u)  as well. 
We  suppose  that  the  central  planner  in  this  model  wishes  to  use  a 
solution  that  has  appealing  properties  (such  as the  Nash  bargaining  solu- 
tion  discussed  in  the  next  section).  Using  such  a  solution,  he  will  in 
general  not  elicit  the  players’  true  preferences  in a Nash  equilibrium,  and, 
indeed,  some  of  the  solution’s  attractive  properties,  notably  efficiency, 
may  be  lost  ex  post.  The  question  we  raise  in  this  paper  is: can  one  find 
restrictions  on  the  allowed  reports  of  the  players,  such  that  the  set  of 
possible  Nash  equilibria  is  narrowed  down  to  the  set  of  efficient  Nash 
equilibria‘? 
The  restriction  we  impose  in  this  paper  is self-optimality: 
DEFINITION.  An  n-tuple  14 E % is called  seljbptimalfbr  (a solution)  cp 
if  (II,  u)  E  Q  x  A  is a Nash  equilibrium  for  cp and  II,  for  every  a  E  cp(rr). 
(By  the  utility  equivalence  implied  in  the  definition  of  a solution  cp, it  is of 
course  sufficient  for  self-optimality  that  (M, a)  be  a  Nash  equilibrium  for 
some  u  E  p(u).)  Self-optimality  of  a vector  of  reports  II means  that  these 
reports  constitute  a Nash  equilibrium  given  that  they  are  the  true  reports. 
In  requiring  the  players’  reports  to  be  self-optimal,  the  central  planner 
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Suppose  1  receive  reports  that  are  not  self-optimal.  If  these  reports  are  the  true 
utility  functions  of  the  players,  then  1  know  that  at  least  one  player  could  have 
deviated  and  thereby  gained.  So  there  must  be  one  or  more  players  lying,  since  I 
assume  the  players  to  be  utility  maximizers. 
In  this  situation,  the  central  planner  could  punish  the  collective  of  the 
players  for  being  provably  dishonest,  e.g.,  by  choosing  a  known  bad 
alternative.  Instead  of  modifying  the  game  in  this  way,  we  will  equiva- 
lently  assume  that  the  players  are  obliged  always  to  come  up  with  a self- 
optimal  Nash  equilibrium  vector  of  reports.  Thus,  self-optimality  can  be 
viewed  as a  very  mild  honesty  requirement. 
There  is a close  relationship  between  self-optimality  and  strategy  proof- 
neSS (in  the  social  choice  literature-for  instance,  Moulin,  1983;  Peleg, 
1984)  or  incentive  compatibility  (in  mechanism  theory-for  instance, 
Hurwicz,  1972;  Myerson,  1979).  In  the  present  setting,  these  concepts 
(which  are  statements  about  a  solution  cp) would  mean  self-optimality  of 
every  u  E  %  for  (a. Thus,  self-optimality  is  much  weaker,  and  our  ap- 
proach  is more  in  line  with  Thomson  (1984),  and,  for  the  specific  context 
we  study  in  the  next  section,  with  Sobel  (1981).  The  next  section  studies 
bargaining  over  the  division  of  a  commodity  bundle;  we  show,  mainly, 
that  self-optimality  leads  to  a characterization  of  efficient  Nash  equilibria. 
The  final  Section  3 concludes  with  some  discussion. 
2.  DISTORTION  OF UTILITIES  IN  BARGAINING 
Let  there  be  two  players  who  are  to  divide  a bundle  of  m  commodities. 
There  is exactly  one  unit  of  each  commodity.  So the  set of  alternatives  A 
can  be  described  as {x  E  KY:  0 I  x  5  1) where  0  (1)  denotes  the  vector 
with  only  zeros  (ones).  The  interpretation  of  x  E  A  is  that  player  1 re- 
ceives  x  and  player  2  receives  1  -  x.  Let  Q1  denote  the  collection  of 
functions  ul:  A +  [0,  l]  that  satisfy: 
(i)  U’ is  concave  and  strictly  increasing,  i.e.,  x  2  f  and  x  #  f  j 
u’(x)  >  u’(2); 
(ii)  u’(0)  =  0,  u’(1)  =  1; 
(iii)  U’ is twice  continuously  differentiable  on  the  interior  of  A. 
Condition  (iii),  in  particular  the  word  “twice,”  is needed  in  order  to  be 
able  to  apply  Lemma  2 in  Sobel  (1981),  below. 
We  assume  that  player  I’s  set of  utility  functions  or  strategy  set equals 
Q’,  and  that  player  2’s  strategy  set  is Q2  =  {u*:  A +  R:  there  exists  U’ E 
Qi  with  u2(x)  =  ~‘(1  -  x) for  all x  E A}.  Note  that  u2(x) denotes  player  2’s 
utility  from  receiving  1 -  X. Further,  we  denote  % : = %’  X %2. A solution 
assigns  to  each  u E Q  a subset  of A such  that  all alternatives  in this  subset 
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x E A is called  efjcientfor  u E % if there  is no f  E A with  u’(a)  2  U’(X), 
u*(a)  2  uz(x),  and  with  at least  one  of  these  inequalities  strict.  A solution  cp 
is called  efficient  if  x  is efficient  for  u  for  every  u  E %  and  x  E  (P(M). A 
solution  p  is called  symmetrically  monotonic  if U(X) 1  (4, $) for  every  u  E 
(3  and  x  E  p(u).  Symmetric  monotonicity  can  be  seen  as  a  very  weak 
symmetry  or  monotonicity  property. 
Suppose  the  players  report  a pair  of  utility  functions  II  E %.  Given  the 
solution  p,  the  attainable  set  for  player  1 is defined  as 
A’(u*,  cp) :=  {x  E A:  3  u’  E Q’,  y  E  p(u’.  rr’)[x  I  y]}, 
and  the  attainable  set A2(u’,  cp)  for  player  2 is defined  analogously.  In  what 
follows,  we  will  need  the  requirement  that  such  attainable  sets  have 
smooth  boundaries,  at  least  in  the  interior  of  A.  Formally,  a solution  cp  is 
called  smooth-regular  if  for  any  attainable  set  A’(u?,  cp) there  exists  a 
function  F:  A  --+ R,  continuously  differentiable  on  the  interior  of  A  and 
strictly  increasing,  such  that 
A’($,  cp) =  {x  E A:  F(x)  5  O}, 
and  for  any  attainable  set  A2(u’,  cp) there  exists  a  function  G:  A  +  R, 
continuously  differentiable  on  the  interior  of  A  and  strictly  decreasing, 
such  that 
A2(u’,  p)  =  {x  E A:  G(x)  5  O}. 
Note  that,  in  general,  F and  G will  depend  on  U? and  N’,  respectively.  The 
monotonicity  conditions  on  F and  G guarantee  that  the  (preferred)  bound- 
aries  of  these  attainable  sets are  given  by  F(x)  = 0 and  G(x)  = 0,  respec- 
tively. 
A  further  requirement  to  be  imposed  later  on  is  the  following  one.  A 
solution  cp is called  conuex-regular  if  all  attainable  sets  are  convex. 
An  example  is the  solution  Y derived  from  the  well-known  Nash  bar- 
gaining  solution  (Nash,  1950),  as  follows:  to  each  pair  (u’,  u*)  E  %,  v 
assigns  the  subset  of  all x E A such  that  the  product  u’(x)u’(x)  is maximal 
on  A.  For  simplicity,  we  call v the  Nash  solution.  This  solution  is efficient 
and  symmetrically  monotonic.  Smooth-regularity  and  convex-regularity 
of  the  Nash  solution  are  consequences  of  Lemma  2  in  Sobel  (1981,  p. 
612). 
It  is easy  to  see  that  v is not  “strategy-proof,”  that  is,  that  not  every 
u  E %  is self-optimal  for  v: for  instance,  for  the  case  of  one  commodity, 
Crawford  and  Varian  (1979)  have  already  shown  that,  for  each  player, 
reporting  the  (unique)  linear  utility  function  is dominant.  Also  the  follow- 256  HANS PETERS 
ing  example,  taken  from  Sobel(1981,  p.  617),  can  be  used  to  this  end.  We 
include  it,  however,  to  show  that  a  Nash  equilibrium  may  lead  to  an 
alternative  that  is inefficient  for  the  true  utility  functions. 
EXAMPLE.  Let  m  =  2, let  u’(x)  = x:‘“x:‘“,  u’(x)  = (5x’  + 3x,)/8,  u’(x)  = 
u2(x)  =  d(l  -  x’)(l  -  x2).  Then  (u’,  u2, (2, 4)) is a Nash  equilibrium  for  v 
and  (u’,  u2), as can  be  verified  with  the  aid  of  Lemma  2  in  Sobel  (1981). 
Consider  the  allocation  (;Z, 4).  Then  u’(f,  3)  >  u’(d,  4) whereas  u’(;i,  #  = 
u2Q, 4). So the  above  Nash  equilibrium  allocation  is inefficient  for  the  true 
preferences  (u’ , u2). 
Thus,  the  Nash  solution  1, admits  inefficient  Nash  equilibrium  alterna- 
tives.  Besides,  there  may  be  inefficient  Nash  equilibria  not  Pareto  domi- 
nated  by  some  efficient  Nash  equilibrium  (Sobel,  1981,  p.  617,  same  ex- 
ample):  therefore,  it  may  be  plausible  that  the  players  actually  come  up 
with  an  inefficient  equilibrium.  How  can  a central  planner  avoid  this,  not 
knowing  the  true  preferences  and  still  using  the  Nash  solution  v?  The 
following  observation  gives  an  answer  to  this  question. 
In  the  following,  “V”  denotes  “the  gradient  of.” 
THEOREM  2.1.  Let  cp  be  an  ejjkient  and  smooth-regular  solution.  Let 
(u,  2)  be  a  Nash  equilibrium  for  cp and  u  E (3.  Suppose  i  is  an  interior 
point  of  A,  and  suppose  u  is self-optimal  for  cp. Then  .? is ef$c.ient  for  u. 
Proof.  Let  the  functions  F  and  G  correspond  to  the  attainable  sets 
A’(u2,  cp)  and  A2(u’,  cp), repectively,  as in  the  definition  of  smooth-regular- 
ity.  Since  (u,  a) is a Nash  equilibrium  for  cp  and  u, 2 maximizes  u’ on  A’(u2, 
q)  and  u2 on  A’(u’,  cp). Since  u’ and  Fare  increasing,  u1 and  G decreasing, 
and  i  is by  assumption  an  interior  point  of  A,  F(1)  =  G(i)  =  0 and  there 
are  numbers  A and  A’  with  Vu’(a)  =  hVF(.?),  VU~(~)  =  A’VG(a).  For 
analogous  reasons  and  the  self-optimality  of  11,  there  exist  numbers  p  and 
11’ with  Vu’(a)  =  pVF(.?),  V&(a)  =  pVG($.  By  the  efficiency  of  cp and 
hence  of  2 for  11,  there  is a number  K  with  Vu’(a)  = ~Vd(i).  Combining  all 
these  equalities,  we  find  that  Vu’(a)  is a multiple  of  Vu’(i).  Since  u’ and  u2 
are  concave,  this  implies  efficiency  of  i  for  u.  n 
Thus,  when  using  an  efficient  and  smooth-regular  solution,  the  central 
planner  can  achieve  efficiency  by  requiring  the  reports  to  be self-optimal, 
that  is, by  requiring  the  reports  to  be not  provably  dishonest.  There  is also 
a converse  to  this  theorem.  We  start  with  a definition. 
DEFINITION.  An  equal  income  competitiue  equilibrium  (EICE)  for 
u  E Q  is a pair  (p.  2)  where 
(i)  p  E  R”,  p  P  0,  i  E A 
(ii)  .f  solves 
max  u’(x)  subject  to  p  . .Y  5  $p  . 1 and  .Y  E  A SELF-OPTIMALITY  AND  EFFICIENCY  257 
and 
max  v*(x)  subject  to  p  3 (1  -  X) i  4p  . 1 and  x  E A. 
So  an  equal  income  competitive  equilibrium  is a competitive  equilibrium 
starting  from  equal  division  of  the  goods.  Note  that  a price  vector  p  in an 
EICE  must  be  positive,  since  the  utility  functions  are  strictly  monotonic. 
Hence,  such  a price  vector  p gives  rise  to  an  element  p”  of  %’ by  F’(X)  : = 
p  * X(Xc’pi)-’  and  an  element  p*  by  p*(x)  :=  p  * (1  -  x)(~~~~;)-’  for  all 
x  E A. 
LEMMA  2.1.  Let  (p,  .?) be  an  ElCE  for  v.  Let  cp be  a  symmetrically 
monotonic  solution.  Then  ((9,  p?),  a)  E 011  x  A is a Nash  equilibrium  for 
cp and  v. 
Proof.  By  symmetric  monotonicity  of cp, for  all II E %,  if x E cp(u’, $), 
then  p2(x)  2  4,  which  implies  p’(x)  5  f.  Similarly,  x  E  cp(p’,  u*> implies 
F,“(X) 5  i.  Further,  since  (p,  2)  is an  EICE  for  v and  the  utility  functions 
are  strictly  monotonic,  we  have  p  .i  =  Bp * 1 = p  . (1 -  a),  which  implies 
F’(a)  = p’(.Q  =  f.  Therefore,  2 is efficient  for  (p’,  p?).  and  hence  P E cp(jT’, 
~7”) by  symmetric  monotonicity.  We  conclude  that  ((fl,  p’),  a)  is a Nash 
equilibrium  for  cp and  v.  n 
A  consequence  of  Lemma  2.1  is  the  existence  of  a  Nash  equilibrium 
since,  by  standard  arguments,  an  EICE  always  exists.  Let  l/2  denote  the 
vector  in  [w”  with  all  coordinates  equal  to  1. 
LEMMA  2.2.  Let  cp be  a  symmetrically  monotonic  and  efjkient  solu- 
tion.  Let  (2,  u) be a Nash  equilibrium  for  (a and  v.  Then  v’(a)  2  u'(1/2)  and 
v*(a)  2  v2(1/2). 
Proof.  We  prove  only  the  first  inequality.  Suppose  to  the  contrary 
that  v’(Z)  <  v’(1/2).  Given  u*,  player  1 can  report  some  utility  function  12’ 
which  is linear  on  the  diagonal 
D  :=  {(t,  t,  .  .  . ,  t)  E  BP:0  5  t  5  l}, 
and  such  that  D  is exactly  the  set of  alternatives  that  are  efficient  for  ti : = 
(li’,  u2).  By  efficiency  and  symmetric  monotonicity  of  p,  (p(c) =  {(f,  .  .  . , 
i)}  for  some  i 2  l/2.  So  d(i,  .  .  . , 6  2  v’(1/2)  >  v’(a),  contradicting  the 
assumption  that  (u,  2)  is a  Nash  equilibrium.  n 
LEMMA  2.3.  Let  cp be  a  convex-regular,  ef$cient,  and  symmetrically 
monotonic  solution.  Let  (u,  2)  be  a  Nash  equilibrium  for  cp and  v with  P 
efhcient  for  v.  Then  (Vu'(i),  i)  is an  EICE  for  v. 
Proof.  Since  f  is efficient  for  v, and  since  the  attainable  sets A'(M?,  p) 
and  A’(u’,  cp)  are  convex,  the  hyperplane  Vu'(R)  . x  =  Vu'(i)  . 2  separates 258  HANS  PETERS 
these  sets  at  z?. Let  p  :=  Vu’(J);  then  it  follows  that  (u,  2) is also  a Nash 
equilibrium  for  (p’,  p2).  Hence,  by  Lemma  2.2,  $(a)  2  p1(1/2)  andp2($r 
a2(1/2).  Combined,  these  inequalities  imply  Vu’(a)  * 4  =  Vu’(a)  * l/2  =  l/ 
2Vv’(li)  *  1.  Hence,  at  f  the  function  u1 is  maximized  subject  to  the 
constraint  Vu’(J)  * x I  1/2Vv’(i)  * 1, and  u2 is maximized  subject  to  Vul($ 
* (1  -  x)  I  1/2Vu’(i)  . 1.  In  other  words,  (Vui(a),  a)  is an  EICE  for  u.  n 
Lemma  2.3  is the  only  result  in  which  convexity  of  the  attainable  sets  is 
used.  For  the  Nash  solution,  a direct  proof  of  this  result  is given  by  Sobel 
(1981,  Theorem  5). 
LEMMA  2.4.  Let  cp  be  a symmetrically  monotonic  solution.  Let  (p,  a) 
be  an  EICE  for  u E  %.  Then  (j5’,  p2)  is self-optimal  for  cp. 
Proof.  From  the  definition  of  EICE  and  the  strict  monotonicity  of  the 
utility  functions  it follows  that  p  . f  = p  . (1  -  a)  = Bp . 1. This  implies  ?Z  E 
cp($,  p2)  by  symmetric  monotonicity  of  cp. Suppose  there  were  a U’ E %’ 
and  an  x  E  (a(~‘,  p2)  with  p’(x)  >  p’(f)  =  &. Then  p2(x)  <  f,  which 
contradicts  the  symmetric  monotonicity  of  cp. One  similarly  shows  that 
player  2 cannot  gain  from  unilaterally  deviating.  So ((PI,  p’),  a) is a Nash 
equilibrium  for  cp and  (pi,  p2);  hence  (p”,  p’)  is self-optimal  for  cp.  w 
We  can  now  prove: 
THEOREM  2.2.  Let  cp  be a convex-regular,  efficient,  and  symmetrically 
monotonic  solution.  Let  B be a Nash  equilibrium  allocation  for  cp  und  u E 
Q  that  is  ef$cient  for  u.  Let  p  :=  Vu’(a).  Then  ((PI,  ,S),  a)  is  a  Nush 
equilibrium  for  cp and  u with  a  self-optimal  pair  of  reports. 
Proof.  First  apply  Lemma  2.3,  then  Lemma  2.1,  and  finally  Lemma 
2.4.  w 
Summarizing,  we  note  that  for  an  efficient  and  smooth-regular  solution, 
self-optimality  leads  to  an  allocation  on  the  contract  curve  in  the  Edge- 
worth  box  associated  with  the  division  problem.  Actually,  the  reported 
indifference  curves  must  coincide  locally  with  the  true  indifference  curves 
(which  supports  our  intuition  of  self-optimality  as  a  very  weak  honesty 
requirement).  This  observation  follows  from  the  proof  of  Theorem  2. I, 
which  is based  mainly  on  the  smoothness  of  the  boundaries  of  the  attain- 
able  sets.  Further,  Theorem  2.2  states  that  for  a convex-regular,  efficient, 
and  symmetrically  monotonic  solution,  any  efficient  Nash  equilibrium 
allocation  can  be obtained  by a self-optimal  pair  of  reports.  Requiring  self- 
optimality  does  not  narrow  down  the  set  of  efficient  Nash  equilibria. 
By  applying  Lemmas  2 and  3 in  Sobel(1981),  finally,  it  can  be  seen that 
our  results  hold  for  the  Nash  solution  as  well  as  for  the  Kalai-Smoro- 
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3.  DISCUSSION 
We  have  introduced  the  concept  of  self-optimality  for  a general  class of 
social  choice  problems.  Application  to  a  specific  bargaining  context  has 
led  to  a characterization  of  efficient  Nash  equilibria  for  solutions  satisfy- 
ing  a number  of  reasonable  conditions.  Efficiency  and  symmetric  mono- 
tonicity  are  easily  verifiable  conditions.  Convex-  and  smooth-regularity 
are properties  stated  only  indirectly,  in terms  of attainable  sets,  and  there- 
fore  are  less readily  verifiable.  This  last  point  may  well  be  considered  a 
drawback. 
Another  way  to  obtain  efficiency  of  the  final  outcome  is to  allow  only 
linear  preferences.  As  Sobel  (1981,  Theorem  2)  shows,  if  the  reported 
preferences  in  a  Nash  equilibrium  are  linear,  then  (under  certain  condi- 
tions)  they  must  support  an  EKE  allocation,  which  is  always  efficient. 
Furthermore,  the  results  above  show  that  (under  certain  conditions  again) 
all efficient  Nash  equilibrium  allocations  can  be  reached  by  linear  prefer- 
ences.  Comparing  the  two  approaches-self-optimality  and  linearity- 
however,  we  think  that  the  former  has  a  number  of  advantages. 
First,  the  self-optimality  criterion  is a more  general  principle  than  line- 
arity.  Indeed,  it can  be  formulated  even  if  linearity  of  preferences  has  no 
meaning:  linearity  comes  out  in  the  specific  application  discussed  in  this 
paper. 
Second,  in  this  specific  application,  self-optimal  preferences  do  not 
have  to  be  linear,  as  is  shown  by  the  following  example.  Although  the 
difference  with  linear  preferences  in  this  example  is not  very  essential,  it 
remains  true  that  self-optimality  admits  a larger  class  of  preferences. 
EXAMPLE.  Let  m  =  I  (one  commodity),  let  u’(x)  :=  $x for  all 0 5  x 5 
t,U’(X):=gx+~forall~rxr  l,u’(x):=  I  -xforallO5x5  l.Then(u, 
4) is a Nash  equilibrium  for  u and  (say)  the  Nash  solution  V. Note  that  U’  is 
not  linear-although  it  is linear  on  a “ray”  connecting  0 and  the  solution 
alternative. 
Third,  and  of  interest  by  itself,  self-optimality  gives  an  alternative  charac- 
terization  of  efficient  Nash  equilibria  in  the  utility  distortion  game. 
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